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Firm innovation is key for many companies to continuously thrive in the
marketplace. Unfortunately, there are drawbacks to making innovative
investments because of the upfront costs and riskiness of future returns. This
creates conflicts because managers are under pressure to meet short-term earnings
forecasts. A managers’ short-term focus on a firm’s business strategy may not be in
the best interests of the shareholders’ long-term vision of a firm. For this reason, a
strong corporate governance system can trigger an increased level of monitoring of
the decision-making of managers so that it’s aligned with shareholders’ goals.
Often, a firm’s long-term strategy focuses on firm innovation. A major influencer of
a firm’s innovative strategy is its ownership structure.

This research specifically

focuses on the impact of ownership concentration, institutional ownership, activist
investors, large passive investors, and Board of Director composition on firm
innovation. Key components of a firm’s organizational structure, such as ownership
concentration and Board member composition, are analyzed to explain the variance
iii

of innovation when other variables are controlled. Based on a sample of technology
firms, the findings show that publicly-traded information technology firms’ level of
passive investors and percentage of independent Board members are significant
relative to firm innovation. There are also important findings from the unsupported
variables, which are the firm’s ownership concentration of shareholders, activist
investors, and institutional investors. Finally, inferences are drawn from these
results as to whether a firm’s ownership structure and governance affect a firm’s
long-term strategy.
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Preface
The competitive environment in economic markets is changing so firms must
adjust their focus at a rapid pace to experience growth. The nature of firm growth is
a heterogeneous, complex, and dynamic process that involves economic, social, and
cultural factors (Delmar, Davidsson, & Gartner, 2003; Wong, Ho, & Autio, 2005) and
often requires a sound long-term strategy. Many firms place a greater emphasis on
meeting short-term results over adhering to a sustainable long-term strategy, which
is known as short-termism (Graham & Campbell, 2001). Contenders of firm shorttermism discuss the potential impacts of this phenomenon, such as discouragement
for business managers from undertaking investments in innovation that yield returns
in the long-term. Business decisions that result from short-termism, which include
decreased spending on innovative activities, add to the volatility of capital markets
through rapid shifts in investment (Sappideen, 2011).
An innovative strategy requires synergy creation between technologies,
organizational structures, and operational processes to generate firm value, but there
are complexities because innovative activities are typically long-term, risky,
changeable, intensive, and idiosyncratic in nature (Holmstrom, 1989). Innovative
initiatives are delayed at firms because of the pressure to meet short-term earnings
expectations, which are influenced by firm stakeholders (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk,
1991; Kahan & Rock, 2007; Appel, Gormley, & Keim, 2015). A firm’s organizational
structure, which includes the Board and business managers, is influenced by the
firm’s stockholders. The most influential stockowners are the highly concentrated

xi

ones. Highly concentrated stockowners are often institutional investors, activist
investors, and passive investors as well. This research dissemination attempts to
offer insights related to the relationship between ownership structure, firm
governance, and level of innovative activity at publicly-traded IT firms.

xii

Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
1.1. Research Question
How, if at all, are a firm’s ownership structure, governance, and level of innovative
activity related?
1.2. Statement of Problem
Innovation is key for firms to have a long-term competitive advantage from
other firms in the market (Tian, & Wang, 2014). Strategic investment in innovative
activities is important for a firm to generate future economic returns (Franko, 1989),
but investments in innovative activities involve a high probability of failure
(Holmstrom, 1989). In publicly-traded companies, the pressure to report regular
income profits induces managers to focus on the short-term firm strategy (Porter,
1992), which means that innovative activities are decreased because the benefits are
typically observed in the long-term. Firms trying to compete in the marketplace with
innovation need an organizational structure that continuously and uninterruptedly
supports innovative investment (Chen, Hsu, & Huang, 2010) despite competing
business objectives.
While innovation is necessary for some firms to grow, there are managers who
focus on strategies other than innovative ones.

A firm’s ownership structure

additionally influences a firm’s innovative strategy because stockowner type
indicates the degree to which investors have influence over the Board and the firm’s
strategy (Phan, Markman, & Balkin, 2016).

Three critical influencers of

management’s decisions are highly concentrated shareholders, institutional
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investors, and the Board (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991). Bushee (1998) contends
that the large ownership concentration by a few institutional investors allows them
to monitor managers to ensure that managers choose innovative projects that
maximize long-term value rather than focus on meeting short-term earnings goals.
Hill and Snell (1988) find a higher proportion of non-independent Board members
positively affects a firm’s level of innovative investment.

While ownership

concentration and Board member composition influence a firm’s ownership structure,
there are other significant investor types as well.
Other influential stakeholders in a firm’s organization structure are active and
passive investors.

In fact, activist investors are key players in both corporate

governance and corporate control (Kahan & Rock, 2007). Not only is this the case
with activist investors, Appel, Gormley, & Keim (2016) suggest that large passive
investors play a key role in influencing firms’ governance choices, which affects a
firm’s level of innovation. A firm’s organizational and ownership structure influences

a firm’s level of innovation, which impacts its long-term strategy and results.
1.3. Literature Review
1.3.1.

Innovation. Wang and Ahmed (2004) define innovation as the process

of developing new products, services, methods of production, market segments,
sources of supply, and organizational forms.

Shah and Chattopadhyay (2014)

highlight that innovation occurs when a new replicable process is formed and is not
a reinvention of an existing process or product; innovative processes are actions that
satisfy customer needs and preferences and are neglected by rivals (Hilman &
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Kaliappen, 2015).

Successful innovative projects increase a firm’s competitive

advantage in the long-term and serve as a critical driving force for firm survival and
growth (Schumpeter, 1934), but this is not without difficulties.
Innovative projects are often complex, and the benefits from innovative
activities are typically realized over long-term horizons. Holmstrom (1989) argues
that innovation is difficult to manage, has uncontrollable outcomes, and is limited by
bureaucracy and financial constraints.

There are other deterrents to successful

innovative projects, such as conflicts of interest between stockholders and managers,
which are predominately driven by pressure for managers to meet short-term
earnings expectations.
Many firms suffer from agency problems, which arise when shareholders and
managers have different goals and interests for the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
The agency conflict is mitigated with a strict process of monitoring a manager’s ability
to make business decisions that are solely focused on meeting short-term earnings
targets, which is typically done by the Board and highly-concentrated shareholders
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The strict monitoring of management by shareholders is
an example of a control process that occurs due to the separation between firm
ownership and control of business decisions; this concept is highlighted by the
incentive alignment effect.
The incentive alignment effect relates to the separation of firm ownership and
control and triggers stockowner confidence in the business decisions of managers
when managerial incentives are aligned with the interests of stockowners (Jensen &
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Meckling, 1976). The incentive alignment effect is advantageous for several different
firm strategies. For example, the incentive alignment effect is helpful when a firm
has an innovative strategy because both managers and stockowners are motivated to
focus on firm innovation despite the risks. Investment in innovative activities is a
high-risk and high-return strategy, and many innovative activities do not lead to
long-term ROI increases despite the potential for future high profits (Mansfield,
1969). Therefore, an innovative strategy can lead to lower short-term profits.
Even when managers are focused on the firm’s long-term strategy, they always
face pressures to meet short-term earnings expectations.

There are trade-offs

between innovation and short-term earnings performance. For example, managers
are reluctant to invest in long-term innovative projects because of high failure rates
that lead to short-term decreases in share price and net income (Mansfield, 1968).
Investors may not promote a firm strategy that is focused on innovation due to limited
understanding of the benefits that are associated with this strategy, which is an
example of information asymmetry (Aboody & Lev, 2000).
Information asymmetry leads managers to forego investments in innovation to
boost short-term earnings performance and appease shareholder investment
preferences, and this can be caused by the lack of information about the potential
financial benefits that are from a firm’s innovative activities (Dechow & Sloan, 1991).
Bebchuck and Stole (1993) show that when managers lack information or
understanding about long-term innovative projects, they are more motivated to spend
less on them. A firm’s innovative activities are heavily monitored by managers, the
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Board, and stockholders to alleviate information asymmetries and enable all
stakeholders to make informed decisions about innovative investments. If these
projects are successful, the innovative process leads to a patented product.
1.3.2.

Patents. A patent is a legal device that gives firms the proprietary

right to an invention for commercial purposes and results from innovative activities
(Foray, 2010). The extent to which firms use patents to protect their intellectual
property rights is a central issue in the economics and legalities associated with
innovation (Nicholas, 2010; 2011), and the inventor must openly disclose the technical
details on the invention in exchange for patent rights (Foray, 2010). Patents provide
patent owners with exclusive rights, so they can choose when to make an investment
with the patented product or concept. This shows how patents create valuable real
options (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2002). Patents are comparable to real options because
they create the right, not the obligation, to realize the value of the underlying asset
(Cotropia, 2009). Patents and innovations have firm benefits, but it’s key for these
initiatives to be monitored by members of a firm’s corporate governance system.
1.3.3.

Corporate governance. When analyzing a firm’s innovation strategy,

it is important to understand the firm’s corporate governance model as well. A firm’s
corporate governance bridges the separation of stockowners, who are the riskbearers, and managers, who are the decision-makers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Corporate governance research focuses on the stockowners of a firm and suggests
that innovative activity is enabled when there is a conducive ownership structure.
This is because a firm’s ownership structure influences the allocation of funds, the
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collaboration between stockowners and managers, and the cooperation of controlling
and minority stockowners, which typically leads to improved internal control
processes and financial results (Berle & Means, 1932). Jensen and Meckling (1976)
posit that the ownership structure of a firm is a function of the information
asymmetries and agency costs that occur because of the separation of ownership and
control between stockowners and managers (Francis, 1995).

A firm’s corporate

governance model helps align the preferences between stockowners and managers,
which becomes increasingly important when there is a high level of ownership
concentration by a few shareholders.
1.3.4.

Ownership concentration. Highly concentrated stockowners monitor

managers to ensure that their decisions are in the best interests of the company
(Perry & Rainey, 1988). Highly concentrated shareholders have incentives to monitor
management’s decisions closely, so they focus on the firm’s long-term performance
because of the amount of capital they have invested in the firm (Alchian, & Demsetz,
1972).

Highly concentrated shareholders also have an ability to influence

management. Cubin and Leech (1983) find that highly concentrated stockowners
have more power over management than less concentrated stockholders. Highly
concentrated stockholders influence a firm’s strategies and decision-making
processes (Perry & Rainey, 1988).
There is a positive correlation between ownership concentration by a few
shareholders and incentive alignments between themselves and managers, which
causes the highly concentrated shareholders to be entrenched in the firm’s daily
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activities (Fama & Jensen, 1983a). The incentive alignment effect implies that equity
ownership belonging to a few shareholders gives them an incentive to optimize firm
performance because it increases their personal wealth (Tsao & Chen, 2012).
Incentive alignment problems arise due to the separation of ownership and control at
publicly-traded companies (Berle & Means, 1932), which leads to reductions in longterm firm value as managers make decisions for their own personal benefit (Levitas,
Barker, & Ahsan, 2011).

Highly concentrated stockowners attempt to reduce

incentive alignment problems as they become more entrenched in a firm by gaining
more knowledge about the firm’s daily activities.
As stockownership becomes more concentrated by a few shareholders, the
concentrated shareholders become more informed on the firm’s daily activities
because of the stockowners’ financial interest in the firm; this is known as the
entrenchment effect (Tsao & Chen, 2012).

Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988)

indicate that the entrenchment effect is frequently observed when stockowners are
highly concentrated owners. There are mixed findings related to whether highly
concentrated stockowners become entrenched in a firm and impact the level of
innovative activities. Tsao and Chen (2012) find a negative correlation between the
level of investments in innovative activities and ownership concentration. Unlike
Tsao and Chen (2012), Hill and Snell (1988) report a significant, positive relationship
between the amount of R&D expense and concentration of equity ownership by a few
shareholders, which suggests that highly concentrated stockowners encourage
corporate investment in innovative activities. Francis and Smith (1995) additionally
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find a positive correlation between ownership concentration and innovation, which
suggests that highly concentrated stockowners, such as institutional investors, prefer
long-term firm strategies.
1.3.5.

Institutional investor.

Institutional investors are financial

institutions, such as mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds, banks, insurance
companies, foundations, and endowments that hold a significant amount of equity in
publicly-traded companies (Zhang & Gimeno, 2016). The increase in stockownership
from institutional investors has significantly impacted corporate governance over the
past several decades.

To support this, institutional investors account for

approximately 10% of traded equity in 1970 and over 60% of traded equity in 2006
(Aghion, Van Reenen & Zingales, 2009). The increase of institutional investor stock
ownership presents a unique opportunity to bridge the information asymmetries
between stock ownership and management (Lipton, 1987). This is driven by an
increased level of monitoring and influence by institutional investors and impacts the
level of firm investment in innovative activities.
There is evidence that long-term institutional ownership is positively
associated with firm innovation (Zahra, 1996).

An explanation for this is that

institutional investors have a fiduciary obligation to maximize long-term value for
their customers, so they emphasize investment in firm innovation (Davis &
Thompson, 1994). Institutional investors pre-commit to long-term holding strategies
rather than short-term focused ones so firm innovation is often a focus (Useem, 2015).
When institutional investors prefer an innovative firm strategy, they have a large
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amount of influence to get firms to adhere to an innovative strategy because a sell-off
by an institutional investor will significantly drive down a firm’s stock price (Davis &
Thompson, 1994). The influence on a firm’s strategy by managers helps to minimize
the effects of managerial myopia.
Managerial myopia theory refers to the underinvestment by managers in longterm, high-risk projects, such as R&D (Bushee, 1998). Stein (1988; 1989) explains
the increase in managerial myopic behavior by the short-term earnings preferences
of shareholders, even when stockowners are rational investors. According to the
managerial myopia theory, institutional investors value short-term financial benefits
over long-term potential gains (Kochhar & David, 1996). Unlike many researchers,
Graves (1988) finds a negative correlation between institutional investors and
innovation; a plausible explanation for this is that money managers at institutions
are reviewed and rewarded based on short-term periodic performance measures. The
prevalence of institutional investors at publicly-traded companies has shifted many
firms’ corporate governance models and ownership structures, but activist investors
are an even more dramatic driver of change at firms.
1.3.6. Activist investor. Investor activism refers to actions taken by investors
to pressure managers to do what the activist investor wants them to do (Parthiban,
Hitt, & Javier, 2001) by using a strategy where an activist investor purchases a large
stake in a firm with the open intent of influencing the firm’s policies and business
activities (Klein & Zur, 2006). An activist investor is a shareholder who wants a ROI
that is larger than if the activist investor is passive. An activist investor takes direct
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action to get firms to change their behaviors to get a higher ROI (MacGregor &
Campbell, 2008). Investor activism highlights the dissatisfaction of shareholders on
firm performance, which forces managers to focus on shareholder demands and the
inadequacy of managerial decisions (Parthiban et al., 2001).
Investor activism serves as a catalyst for change in an organization, has
dramatic effects on firm performance, and acts as a trigger to decrease managerial
power. Investor activism makes managers more responsive to the needs of investors
through increased monitoring by the activist investor and the Board (Parthiban et
al., 2001). Activist investors also work directly with managers. Activist investors
recommend specific courses of action to management.

If managers contest the

recommendations, an activist investor tries to persuade management to follow the
recommendations by enlisting other shareholders to suggest the activists’ course of
action, seek a legal remedy, or launch a proxy battle (MacGregor & Campbell, 2008).
Activist investor proposals typically have one of the following characteristics:
•

Preference of short-term financial results and short-term focused shareholders;

•

Emphasis on investments other than capital spending, R&D expense,
acquisitions, and entrepreneurship;

•

Emphasis on shareholders over stakeholders (MacGregor & Campbell, 2008).
Despite the findings from MacGregor and Campbell (2008), activist investors

profit from industries that are heavily vested in R&D and innovation, such as firms
in the IT industry. In 2014, IT firms accounted for 20% of the firms that were an
activists’ target; this was more than firms from any other industry outside of firms in
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the financial services industry (Ovide & Clark, 2015). Some noteworthy activist
investors are Carl Icahn and Jana Partners. These activist investors have amassed
a large percentage of ownership interest in several large IT firms, such as Apple,
Qualcom, and Microsoft, with the goal of altering each targeted firm’s excessive
spending on innovative projects (Ovide & Clark, 2015). When investing in IT firms,
activist investors focus on strategic rather than excessive investment in innovation.
Brav, Jiang, Song, & Tian (2016) support this by finding that a firm is more efficient
on spending for innovative activities after the activist investor targets the firm.
Investments in innovation are discretionary and can be perceived by an activist
investor as wasteful spending by managers (Phan et al., 2016).

Many activist

investors perceive unpredictable outcomes associated with the innovative process;
they often conclude that there is a more active and efficient reallocation of the
priorities set in the innovative process than the existing model (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy,
& Thomas, 2008a; 2008b). This means that activist investors help managers to reprioritize how capital is allocated to innovative projects. While there are mixed
research findings on whether activist investors prefer innovative firms, the impact of
passive investors on firm innovation is researched as well.
1.3.7.

Passive investor. Many institutions are passive investors and do not

buy or sell shares to influence management’s decisions (Appel et al., 2016). On the
other hand, researchers argue that passive investors trigger idle shareholder
engagement and weakened corporate governance (Kapadia, 2017). There are mixed
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conclusions about the effectiveness of manager monitoring by passive investors
(Appel et al., 2016).
Passive investors typically side with management’s decisions on a firm’s
strategy more often than activist investors who motivate managers to adhere to
investor preferences (Kapadia, 2017). Unlike Kapadia (2017), Appel et al. (2016) find
that the amount of equity owned by passive investors is negatively correlated with
the percentage of votes in support of management proposals and positively correlated
with the percentage of votes in support of governance-related shareholder proposals.
Activist and passive investors have input in a firm’s strategy, but the Board seeks to
drive initiatives that are independent of shareholder preferences.
1.3.8.

Board. Board members drive a firm’s corporate governance initiatives

by negating any decision that demonstrates a lack of good faith for shareholders and
other stakeholders (Man & Wong, 2013); this is set forth in the corporate by-laws.
Corporate by-laws grant Board members the authority to endorse management
initiatives, evaluate managerial performance, and direct management based on the
criteria that best reflects shareholder interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983a). The Board
serves as a safeguard that ensures that managers are acting in the best interests of
shareholders and primary owner of a firm’s governance system (Williamson, 1984);
the Board has governance over a firm’s innovative activities as well.
Many researchers suggest that the Board routinely reviews innovative projects
when analyzing the firm’s resource allocation methods (Casper & Matraves, 2003;
Chung, Wright, & Kedia, 2003; Jensen, 1993; Wright & Kroll, 2002). The Board must
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approve the annual budget and strategic plan submitted by management, which
means they always directly influence the allocation of resources to innovative
activities (Phan et al., 2016). The Board also monitors managements’ activities
beyond the approval of budgets and strategic plans. The two main functions that the
Board performs are to monitor and to advise management (Gu & Zhang, 2016).
By monitoring and counseling management, the Board helps to link the
interests of shareholders, who invest capital in a firm, and managers, who make
decisions intended to create firm value (Monks & Minow, 2011). Proponents of the
agency theory suggest that monitoring is best done by independent Board members
so there are no motivations to ignore certain managerial behaviors (Fama & Jensen,
1983a; Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002), which
includes a short-term focus from a firm’s managers. The Board is expected to promote
strategies that benefit both stockholder short and long-term wealth (Baysinger et al.,
1991) so they do advise on innovative strategies.
The Board facilitates successful innovative projects by offering knowledge and
advisement on innovative projects to a firm’s management team (Xie & O'Neill, 2013).
A non-independent Board member, who is also part of the firm’s operations, has a
better understanding of the firm’s daily activities and is more effective than
independent Board members at supporting an innovative strategy to increase longterm firm value (Zahra, 1996). Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) also find that a Board
that is independent will shy away from entrepreneurial activities, such as innovative
ones, when advising on long-term strategies.
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Unlike independent Board members, non-independent Board members have
access to information that is relevant to assessing managerial competence and the
strategic desirability of innovative initiatives (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). Firms
that are focused on innovation are constantly facing uncertainty related to future
technological advancements within the firm, and managers are unwilling to provide
funding to innovative initiatives because of the potential for lack of future income
gains (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). By including non-independent Board members
in strategy planning sessions, managers are more motivated to focus on innovative
strategies because non-independent Board members have more knowledge about a
firm’s daily activities related to innovation.
Fama and Jensen (1983a) find that the separation of ownership and control at
a firm between stockowners and managers is properly governed when Board
members independently monitor the decisions of managers. Some theorists argue
that independent Board members skew the direction of managerial effort from
optimal risky innovative strategies to more conservative ones despite many
shareholder preferences for the optimal risky ones (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990).
On the other hand, independent Board members are more likely to protect the
interests of shareholder’ preferences for innovative activities because their personal
wealth is not tied to the outcomes of those decisions (Phan et al., 2016). While the
Board drives a firm’s corporate governance, managers steer a firm’s strategy, which
includes the amount of capital that is invested in firm innovation.
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1.3.9.

Manager. An agency problem arises because managers are focused on

unprofitable or short-term strategies that are not parallel with shareholders’ longterm company vision (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Managers make decisions about
future investments that impact the current share price, perceived employment
growth, and increased compensation and benefits (Bushee, 1998).

These decisions

are not always in the firm’s best interests. This is known as the managerial myopic
theory and relates to the pressures that managers have, which causes them to
sacrifice long-term interests to boost short-term profits (Lee, 1997). Only the top
managers in an organization determine the strategy related to matters such as
innovation and financial leverage, which is why corporate governance is so important
(Bantel & Jackson, 1989).
A corporate governance model offers incentives to managers to focus on
innovation, and there needs to be careful monitoring for innovative activities to be
profitable (Hoskisson et al., 2002). He and Wang (2009) support this concept by
describing two key features of innovative-intensive firms as having a high degree of
information asymmetry between stockowners and managers and possessing
substantial managerial discretion for making decisions about the deployment of
innovative knowledge. Managers are incentivized to invest in projects with faster
payoffs, which are often projects other than innovative ones, because of the potential
for increased short-term returns (Zeng & Horn-Chern, 2011). After all, returns from
innovative projects often require considerable time and do not facilitate managerial
short-term goals (Laverty, 1996). While a firm’s corporate governance influences the
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level of innovative activities, a firm’s status as being publicly-traded influences the
level of innovative activities as well.
1.3.10. Public versus private IT firms. Firm innovation is crucial for privatelyheld firms to be competitive in the marketplace (Wright, Hoskisson, Filatotchev, &
Buck, 1998). Bernstein’s (2015) research shows that once a firm goes public, the
amount of firm innovation decreases. Bernstein (2015) theorizes that once a firm
goes public, the strategy changes related to the level of innovative activities. To
support this, managers are more motivated to engage in innovation when a firm is
private versus public (Francis & Smith, 1995; Wright, Robbie, Chiplin, & Albrighton,
2000a; Wright, Hoskisson, Busenitz, 2000b). A positive relationship between private
ownership and innovation is driven by an easing of the effects of the agency conflict
theory (Xie, 2012).
Private ownership is an effective way to solve the agency problem because of a
better alignment between stockholders and managers, which leads to strong
incentives to create more wealth for the firm and each other (Xie, 2012).

The

privatization of a firm offers a supportive governance model that fosters innovative
business activities and serves as a corporate restructuring method (Ahlstrom &
Bruton, 2002). Firms are privately-held because they believe that this will improve
firm performance. Privately-held firms maximize innovative initiatives to dominate
in various market segments because details of innovative activities are hidden from
potential competitors when a firm is privately-held (Aggarwal & Hsu, 2013).
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It is expected that stockholders and managers are more motivated to focus on
innovative strategies at privately-held companies (Wright et al., 2000b). Research
shows that firms pursuing an IPO realize a decline in the quality of their innovations
once they go public due to inventor departures and post-IPO productivity decreases
(Bernstein, 2015).

Harvard economist, F.M. Scherer, suggests that there is more of

an affinity for innovative risk-taking from smaller privately-owned firms over
corporations; this helps to explain why many of the most important innovations have
originated outside of large corporations (Crouch, 2008). As is seen, most researchers
confirm that private firms focus on innovation more than public firms.
1.4. Hypothesis
H1: A firm’s ownership and organizational structure significantly impacts a firm’s
level of innovation when a firm’s Leverage, ROA, and Book to Market Value of Equity
are controlled, all else being equal.
The separation of ownership and control in publicly-traded corporations
creates differing views of the ideal firm strategy from the perspectives of the manager
and stockholder (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Shareholders, for the most part, are
focused on helping to foster long-term firm value despite the goal of managers to gain
personal benefits such as power, status, and wealth by focusing on meeting shortterm financial goals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Highly-concentrated stockowners,
such as activist, passive, and institutional investors, work closely with managers to
pursue a firm strategy that creates long-term value that is often focused on
innovative activities (Chen, Li, Shapiro, & Zhang, 2014).
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A firm’s corporate governance defines the roles of each member in a firm’s
organization structure of the Board, managers, shareholders, and other stakeholders,
and this sets the rules for making decisions on corporate affairs (Ramaswamy, Ueng,
& Carl, 2008). From an agency perspective, firms with a high number of independent
Board members are more likely to make extensive evaluations of strategic decisions
and management behavior (Luo, 2007), which includes the amount of capital to
allocate on firm innovation.
H2: As the level of ownership concentration by a few shareholders increases at a
publicly-traded IT firm, the level of innovative activities increases, all else being
equal.
Large shareholders mitigate agency problems that are driven by the
misalignment of goals between investors and managers (Prowse, 1990), which
includes conflicting interests regarding a firm’s strategy (Lee, 1997).

When

stockowners have a highly concentrated stockownership interest, it is easy for them
to coordinate change at a firm and demand information from management, which
overcomes information asymmetries (Berle & Means, 1932). Francis and Smith
(1995) find a positive correlation between ownership concentration and R&D
expenses. Similarly, Lee (2005) offers empirical evidence that shows that ownership
concentration by a few shareholders affects firm innovation.
H3a: When a publicly-traded IT firm has at least one activist investor vested in the
firm, the level of innovative activities decreases, all else being equal.

18

As it pertains to publicly-traded firms, short-termism refers to companies that
focus on being profitable in the short-term with little regard to whether the business
decisions they make will decrease firm value in the long-term; this typically entails a
decrease in spending on innovative activities (Rose & Sharfman, 2014). Activist
investors are often accused of suffering from short-termism to obtain a quick ROI
(Kahan & Rock, 2007). Clifford (2008) provides evidence that firms that are targeted
by activist investors experience increases in operating profitability, leverage, and a
dividend yield, but a decrease in cash levels (Brav, Jiang, & Kim, 2009). Based on
this research, the level of spending on firm innovation decreases at firms to increase
a firm’s operating profitability.
H3b: When a publicly-traded IT firm has at least one passive investor vested in the
firm, the level of innovative activities decreases, all else being equal.
Appel et al. (2016) find that there are several reasons why passive investors
seek to improve firms’ governance choices and performance, which are primarily
motivated by fund fees that are received in relation to the performance of assets under
management. An increase in passive investors is associated with an improvement in
a firms’ future performance (Appel et al., 2016). Also, passive investors create an
environment that might be conducive for activist investment. Activist investors are
known to gauge the support of a firm’s largest passive institutional investor base
before pursuing demands from managers (Appel et al., 2016). Because of this, passive
investors influence firm spending on innovation simply by enticing activist investors
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to target the same firms that they own. In turn, passive investors directly and
indirectly increase the level of spending on firm innovation.
H4: As the number of shares owned at a publicly-traded IT firm by institutional
investors increases, the amount of innovative activities increases, all else being equal.
Many researchers show that institutional investors value investment in
innovative activities (Baysinger et al., 1991; Hansen & Hill, 1991; Kochhar & David,
1996; Zahra, 1996). This is explained by the fact that institutional investors prefer
holding shares of stock in the long-term (Useem, 2015). Institutional investors also
have legal obligations to their investors to have a portfolio that maximizes returns
(Useem, 2015) so they favor companies that make innovative investments that are
likely to improve long-term performance.

Prahalad (1994) suggests that many

institutional investors cannot sell their ownership stake in a firm without
significantly lowering the firm’s stock price (Lee, 1997).

This puts pressure on

managers to adhere to institutional investor requests, which are typically to focus on
the firm’s long-term strategy, such as an innovative one.
H5: Once an IT firm is a public-traded company (as opposed to being private), the
level of patents and innovation decreases, all else being equal.
When firms are privately held, the agency issues associated with the
separation of ownership and control are not as severe as publicly-traded companies
because the owners are also managers (Aggarwal & Hsu, 2013). Private ownership
is an effective method to solving the agency problem because of the alignment
between the stockowner and manager, which creates incentives to create more
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personal wealth (Xie, 2012). Because of this, private ownership is expected to have a
positive impact on innovation (Zahra, 1995), and there are many reasons for this
phenomenon. There is pressure at publicly-traded companies to control costs, which
leads to decreased spending on innovative activities. Innovation at publicly-traded
firms is undervalued because investors may not fully price the potential increase in
firm value that result from innovative activities (Cohen, Diether, & Malloy, 2013).
Based on these facts, it is more beneficial for private firms to invest in innovation in
comparison to publicly-traded firms.
H6: As the number of non-independent Board members increases, a publicly-traded
IT firm has an increased number of innovative activities, all else being equal.
The Board is one of the key influencers of corporate governance, which helps to
balance the agency conflicts resulting from the separation of ownership and control
(Berle & Means, 1932; Williamson, 1984). Hill and Snell (1989) report a significant
negative relationship between independent Board members and the level of
innovation. This is explained by the fact that independent Board members have less
knowledge of the businesses in comparison to non-independent Board members.
With less access to information, independent Board members are less willing to focus
on innovative strategies because they have a higher perceived risk of innovative
projects. A non-independent Board member better understands the importance of a
firm’s innovative activities and perceives these as being less risky than an
independent Board member.
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics
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2.1. Sample of Attributes
For all the hypotheses, the dataset is from the NASDAQ’s website, which lists
3,195 firms. All companies not in the technology sector are excluded from the sample,
which decreases the number of firms in the sample to 433. Five companies are
subsequently excluded from the sample because they don’t have market
capitalization numbers readily available, which decreases the sample to 428. The
100 firms with the largest market capitalization make up the sample population for
hypotheses 1, 2, 3a, 3b, 4 and 6. During the data collection phase, there are 22
additional firms excluded from the sample due to the following reasons:
•

Foreign (Non-US) issuer that does not file SEC 10-K,

•

Sample lacks Board member data,

•

Sample does not have or lacks some years of SEC 10-K filings,

•

Company divests during one of the sample years, and

•

Company launches an IPO during one of the sample years.

The sample population is 77 firms. For Hypothesis 5, the sample consists of IT firms
that became publicly-traded firms from 2008 to 2016, which is an initial sample to
66. Any firms that had no patents issued are excluded as well. The final sample size
is 29.
2.2.

Variable Measurement

Appendix A provides summary information related to the Independent,
Dependent, and Control Variables. This section provides detailed information about
these sources.
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2.2.1. Independent Variables.

2.2.1.1. Activist Investor. SEC Schedule 13D requires investors, who intend to
influence corporate control, to disclose their ownership and intent within 10 days of
having a sizable percentage of equity ownership in a public-traded firm (Brav et al.,
2009).

The SEC Schedule 13D filing is an important source for understanding

investor activism since it provides information about the identity of the filer, filing
date, ownership, cost of purchase, and most importantly, the purpose of the
investment (Brav et al., 2009). As such, an organization’s SEC Schedule 13D filing
is the source used to gather the level of activist investors for each firm in the sample.

2.2.1.2. Passive Investor. A passive shareholder buys and holds shares of stock
and sells them when the investment goal is met or a more attractive use for the funds
comes along (MacGregor & Campbell, 2008). SEC Schedule 13G is a quarterly filing
for an investor who passively holds a beneficial ownership interest in a firm with no
intent to directly influence change at the firm (Giglia, 2016). As such, an
organization’s SEC Schedule 13G filing is used to measure large passive investors.

2.2.1.3.

Institutional Investor.

Any financial institution exercising

discretionary management of investment portfolios over $100 million in qualified
securities is required to report those holdings quarterly to the SEC using Schedule
13F (Appel et al., 2016). Legislative history indicates that “institutional trading also
has an impact on brokerage services and on the securities industry,” and it is
reasonable to conclude that the SEC Schedule 13F disclosures help to foster a safer
and informed securities market (Pekarek, 2007). Institutional investors own a large
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equity percentage of stock in firms so their SEC Schedule 13F reports are heavily
monitored. As such, an organization’s SEC Schedule 13F filing is used to measure
institutional investors.

2.2.1.4. Independent Board Member. Prior to a firm’s Annual Shareholders’
Meeting, shareholders receive a Proxy Statement, which is required by the SEC
under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Proxy Statement
provides information so that shareholders can make informed decisions at an annual
or special stockholder meeting. The Proxy Statement includes voting information,
background information on Board members, executive compensation details, a list of
the members of the Board audit committee, and a breakdown of audit and non-audit
fees that are paid to the firm’s primary auditor. Proxy Statements also provide
information about Board member composition. Independent Board members are not
on the top management team and do not have a past relationship with the firm. Nonindependent Board members are top management team members who are part of the
firm’s existing daily operating function.

2.2.1.5. Ownership Concentration.

Ownership concentration is an important

variable and a frequently used measurement of HHI. The HHI is calculated using
the following formula (Ginevičius & Čirba, 2007; 2009):

d = the market share of i-th enterprise
N = the total number of enterprises in market
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The values of the HHI are between zero, which signifies a market with perfect
competition where each firm in a population owns an equal percentage of ownership
of the market, and one, which constitutes a pure monopoly where one firm dominates
the market (Krivka, 2016). The HHI is a cumulative concentration indicator using
the market shares of the enterprises as their weights (Krivka, 2016). For purposes
of this study, the HHI is used to calculate ownership concentration, which is the
percentage of equity ownership by highly concentrated shareholders divided by total
common equity stockownership of shares outstanding at a firm. There are other
methods of using the HHI to calculate ownership concentration.

For example,

Demsetz and Lehn (1985) calculate the HHI by calculating the ownership
concentration of the top five and top 20 shareholders.
2.2.2. Control Variables.

2.2.2.1. Leverage. A firm’s leverage shows how much of a company’s assets
belongs to creditors versus shareholders. This is an important metric because it can
drive whether firms make an investment in innovative activities. Phillips (1995)
shows that firms with considerable amounts of debt in comparison to equity must
focus on short-term cash flow generation to cover the debt obligations rather than
make investments in innovative activities.

There are indications that the

relationship between debt-financing and innovative investment is negative (OrtegaArgiles, Moreno, & Caralt, 2005). Other previous studies suggest that firms prefer
equity-financing to debt-financing of R&D activities (Chen et al., 2010).
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2.2.2.2. ROA. Firm performance influences spending on innovation (Chaney
& Devinney, 1992).

This is typically measured with one of two performance

indicators, which are ROA and ROE. ROA is a metric for operating performance and
reflects the earning power of a business (Bebchuk, Brav, & Jiang, 2015). Firm
operating performance is important because a poorly performing firm has no choice
but to cut spending on innovative activities to improve net income results and
maintain existing share price.

2.2.2.3. Market to Book Value of Equity. Market value of equity is the total
dollar market value of company’s outstanding shares and is calculated by multiplying
the company’s current stock price by its number of outstanding shares. The book
value of equity is the value of stockholder’s equity as reflected on a firm’s balance
sheet. The market to book value of equity figure represents the difference between
what the market assesses to be the economic value of common equity and what the
financial statements under GAAP report (Beaver & Ryan, 1993).
2.2.3. Dependent Variable.

2.2.3.1. Innovation. Patents serve as a metric of the effectiveness of a firm’s
innovative activities (Levitas et al., 2011). Schmookler (1962; 1966), and Sokoloff
(1988) agree that patent counts are the standard measure for innovation (Moser,
2016).

Patents inform a firm’s shareholders and stakeholders of the innovative

capabilities of the firm, which reduces information asymmetries between stockowners
and managers (Levitas & McFadyen, 2009).
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A firm’s size influences the amount of expenditures on innovation (Baysinger
& Hoskisson, 1989). Many researchers suggest that a firm’s size may be an important
determinant of R&D expense and innovation because of economies of scale, and many
empirical studies find that smaller firms generate more innovation per dollar of R&D
expense than larger ones (Kim, Lee, & Marschke, 2009). There are studies that depict
the opposite of this, which is summarized by the Schumpeterian hypothesis. The
Schumpeterian hypothesis is based on the premise that large firms are more
innovative than small ones for the following reasons:
•

Large firms benefit from economies of scale and scope that make them more
competitive in comparison to their smaller competitors;

•

Large firms benefit from complementarities and spillovers between different
departments;

•

Large firms are favored by capital markets for the financing of risky innovative
projects (Peeters & de la Potterie, 2006).

For these reasons, the Dependent Variable is a measure of innovation, and this is
calculated by dividing patents by number of employees.
2.3. Methodology
Hypothesis H1, H2, H3a, H3b, H4, H6: Patent data is gathered for the top 100
publicly-traded IT firms from the USPTO’s website for the period of 2005 through
2015. Each company in the sample is listed as the Assignee Name on the patent
application. Patent issue date is the metric that defines the year that the patent is
counted; patent issue date is chosen over application date because this is the date
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that the innovative activities can be deployed under patent protection laws. The
number of stock shares from SEC Schedules 13-D, 13-F, and 13-G filers is gathered
annually for the period of 2005 – 2015.

This data is collected using two different

methods with the following process:

2005 through 2015 data – 13-F
The data is sourced from WhaleWisdom, which is an aggregator of publicly
available financial information related to financial institutions who are required by
law to file forms with the SEC.

WhaleWisdom collects these figures daily.

WhaleWisdom’s data collection process is done in-house and is automated with little
to no human intervention.

2006 through 2015 data – 13-D and 13-G
The data is collected from WhaleWisdom.

2005 data – 13-D and 13-G
WhaleWisdom does not have data for 2005; this data is sourced from the SEC’s
website.

Board member information is from the SEC’s website in the annual Schedule
10-K documents. Each firm’s end-of-year share prices are sourced from the Yahoo
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finance website. All other financial metrics are from the Mergent Online, which is a
financial database system.
Hypothesis H5: Patent data for the IT firms in the sample is from the USPTO website.
The initial population is the top IT firms that are traded on the NASDAQ Exchange
and listed on the NASDAQ’s website. The collection period of the data is from 2008
to 2016 and excludes any pre-2007 data, so results aren’t skewed by the U.S. stock
market crash.

In 2007, The U.S. stock market experienced the worst crash in

financial history since the Great Depression (Meric, Welsh, Weidman, & Marmon,
2011). After the data collection phase, an average is calculated for each sample to
create the Independent and Dependent Variables pre and post IPO.
3. Empirical Results
Summary Statistics: Table 1.1 summarizes the summary statistics for the data
(excluding Hypothesis 5). The mean number of patents is 108, but there is a firm in
the population with 3,161 patents in a year. The sample population comprises of
larger firms so the average balance sheet figures for total assets, total liabilities, and
total equities is large. The average assets, liabilities, and equity (in millions) are
respectively 6,800.59, 2,935.34, and 3,836.49. The average net income of the sample
population is 1,057.01. The average R&D expense / sales is 467.25, but the standard
deviation is 1,397.38. The average number of employees is 10,101, and the maximum
number of employees is 221,700.
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H1: A firm’s ownership and Board structure significantly impacts a firm’s level of
innovation when a firm’s Leverage, ROA, and Book to Market Value of Equity are
controlled, all else being equal.
The results indicate if the Control Variables (Year (2006 – 2015), Leverage,
ROA, and Market to Book Value of Equity) and the Independent Variables
(Institutional Investor, Passive Investor, Activist Investor, Independent Board
Member, and Ownership Concentration) predict the variances in the level of firm
innovation (Patents / # of Employees). As in seen in Table 1.2, there is a significant
F-test (F(19, 750) = 3.48, p < .01) so we can interpret R2 (0.08) as significant.
Therefore, 8.00% of a firm’s level of innovation is explained by the Independent
Variables and Control Variables. The significant regression coefficients are Passive
Investor (b = 0.51) and Independent Board Member (b = 0.29). Therefore, Hypothesis
1 is partially supported.
H2: As the level of ownership concentration increases at a publicly-traded IT firm,
the level of innovative activities increases, all else being equal.
The results indicate if Control Variables (Year (2006 – 2015), Leverage, ROA,
and Market to Book Value of Equity) and the Independent Variable (Ownership
Concentration) predict the variances in the level of firm innovation (Patents / # of
Employees). As is seen in Table 1.2, the model has a significant F-test (F(3, 647) =
2.15, p < .01)) so we interpret the R2 (0.04) as significant. 4.00% of innovation is
explained by the Independent Variable and the Control Variables. The significant
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regression coefficients are ROA (b = 11.22), Market to Book Value of Equity (b = 8.23), and Year 2014 (b = 8.14). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is not supported.
H3a: When a publicly-traded IT firm has at least one activist investor vested in the
firm, the level of innovative activities decreases, all else being equal.
The results indicate if the Control Variables (Year (2006 – 2015), Leverage,
ROA, and Market to Book Value of Equity) and the Independent Variable (Active
Investor) predict the variances in the level of firm innovation (Patents / # of
Employees). As is seen in Table 1.2, the model has a significant F-test (F(3, 185) =
2.01, p < .05)). The R2 (.04) is significant, and 4.00% of the variance of a firm’s level
of innovation is explained by the Independent Variables and Control Variables. The
only significant regression coefficient is ROA (b = 11.40). Therefore, Hypothesis 3a is
not supported.
H3b: When a publicly-traded IT firm has at least one large passive investor vested in
the firm, the level of innovative activities decreases, all else being equal.
The results indicate if the Control Variables (Year (2006 – 2015), Leverage,
ROA, and Market to Book Value of Equity) and the Independent Variable (Passive
Investor) predict the variances in the level of firm innovation (Patents / # of
Employees). As is seen in Table 1.2, the model has a significant F-test (F(3, 647) =
2.35, p < .01)), and the R2 (0.04) is significant, and 4.00% of the variance of a firm’s
level of innovation is explained by the Independent and Control Variables.

In

examining regression coefficients related to Hypothesis 3b, several regression
coefficients are significant: ROA (b = 12.75), Year 2014 (b = 8.57), Passive Investor (b
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= 8.26), and Market to Book Value of Equity (b = -7.58). Therefore, Hypothesis 3b is
supported.
H4: As the number of shares owned by institutional investors at a publicly-traded IT
firm increases, the level of innovative activities increases, all else being equal.
The results indicate if Control Variables (Year (2006 – 2015), Leverage, ROA,
and Market to Book Value of Equity) and the Independent Variable (Institutional
Investor) predict the variances in the level of firm innovation (Patents / # of
Employees). As is seen in Table 1.3, the model has a significant F-test (F(3, 647) =
2.16, p < .01)) so we can interpret the R2 (0.04) as significant. 4.00% of the variance
of innovation can be explained by the Independent and the Control Variables. The
regression coefficients that are considered significant include ROA (b = 10.64),
Market to Book Value of Equity (b = -8.43), and Year 2014 (b = 8.04).

Therefore,

Hypothesis 4 is not supported.
H5: Once an IT firm is a public-traded company (as opposed to being private), the
level of patents decreases, all else being equal.
As can be seen in Table 1.3, the means between post-IPO and pre-IPO are
respectively 1.19 and 0.45. The standard deviations between post-IPO and pre-IPO
are 0.60 and 0.56. As in seen in Table 1.4, the model includes the Independent
Variable ANOVA results (Pre-IPO) and Dependent Variable (Post-IPO). The model
did not have a significant F-test (F(0, 13) = 4.11, p > 0.05). There are no significant
regression coefficients. Therefore, Hypothesis 5 is not supported.
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H6: As the number of non-independent Board members increases, a publicly-traded
IT firm has an increased number of innovative activities all else being equal.
The results indicate if Control Variables (Year (2006 – 2015), Leverage, ROA,
and Market to Book Value of Equity) and the Independent Variable (Independent
Board Member) predict the variances in the level of firm innovation (Patents / # of
Employees). As is seen in Table 1.2, the model has a significant F-test (F(3, 646) =
3.90, p < .01)) so we interpret the R2 (0.07) as significant, and 7.00% of the variances
in innovation are explained by the Independent and the Control Variables. The
significant control variable regression coefficients are Independent Board Member (b
= -18.02) and ROA (b = 11.15). Therefore, Hypothesis 6 is supported.
4. Discussion
Based on regression results, a firm’s percentage of equity ownership by large
passive investors influences its level of innovative activities. Black (1992) supports
these findings and states that there is an incentive for passive managers to improve
their overall performance because fund fees are based on the financial performance
of assets under management. Unlike the findings from Black (1992), Appel et al.
(2016) find little evidence of a change in a firms’ debt issuances, capital expenditures,
R&D expenses, or acquisitions when a large passive investor is present. Aghion et
al. (2013) also find that there is no association between a firm’s level of large passive
investors and firm innovation.
Based on regression results, a firm’s number of independent Board members
(as opposed to non-independent ones) influences its level of innovative activities.
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Osma (2008) posits that independent Board members are likely to question
managerial decisions and constrain cuts on innovative activities. An increase in
independent Board members facilitates and improves the monitoring of managers,
which helps to ensure that they undertake profitable innovative activities (Chen,
2013). This is supported.
Based on the regression results, it is unsupported that a firm’s percentage of
ownership concentration by highly concentrated shareholders impacts a firm’s level
of innovative activities. These findings are contradictory to the findings by Hill and
Snell (1988) who report a significant, positive relationship between the level of R&D
spending in 94 large research-intensive companies and highly concentrated owners.
Francis and Smith (1995) also find a positive correlation between ownership
concentration by a few shareholders and R&D spending. One plausible explanation
for this is that R&D spending is the measure of innovation rather than patent count.
Unlike Hill and Snell (1988) and Francis and Smith (1995), Chandler (1990) finds
that a high concentration of equity ownership by a few stockholders leads to risk
avoiding choices like minimizing spending on innovation.

Unfortunately, the

unsupported findings of this research do not support this either.
Based on the regression results, it is unsupported that the percentage of equity
ownership by a firm’s institutional investors impacts the level of firm innovation.
This is unlike Graves’ (1988) findings, which shows a negative correlation between
institutional ownership and R&D spending.

The unsupported findings are

contradictory to Eng and Shackell (2001) who find a positive correlation between
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institutional ownership and the amount of R&D at firms. Aghion et al. (2015) find a
positive correlation between the amount of equity ownership by institutional
investors and firm innovation. Some researchers suggest that institutional investors
emphasize short-term financial results, which implies less spending on innovative
activities (Drucker, 1986; Mitroff, 1987). The unsupported finding from this research
does not necessarily contradict this conclusion, but it doesn’t support the finding
either.
Based on the regression results, it is unsupported that a firm’s percentage of
equity ownership by activist investors impacts the level of firm innovation. This is
contrary to critics of activist investors who claim that activist investors focus on shortterm gains at the expense of long-term shareholder value (Kahan & Rock, 2007; Brav
et al., 2008). The findings in this research study are contradictory to Aghion et al.
(2013) who find a positive correlation between a firm’s level of institutional investors
and firm innovation. Interestingly, the results from this research are supported by
(Brav et al., 2016) who observe that R&D spending drops significantly during a fiveyear period after an activist investor has a substantial ownership stake in a firm, but
the level of innovative outputs, which is measured by patent counts and citation
counts per patent, does not drop. These findings suggest that activist investors
trigger efficient investments in innovation.
Based on the regression results, IT firms do not perform less innovative
activities after an IPO is launched, and the firm goes public. These findings are not
consistent with Ferreira, Manso, and Silva (2014) whose results show that private
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firms take more risks, invest more in new products and technologies, and pursue
more radical innovations. Similarly, Zahra (1995) finds that private ownership has
a positive impact on firm innovation. Many other researchers support the notion that
private ownership contributes to firm innovation (Francis & Smith, 1995; Wright et
al., 2000a; Weight et al., 2000b).
5. Importance of this Research
The aim of this research is to support the notion that a firm’s ownership
structure and governance model impacts the level of innovative activities that occur,
which is also influenced by the decisions made by managers. The separation of
ownership and control in large publicly owned firms has induced potential conflicts
between the interests of managers and stockholders (Baysinger et al., 1991; Berle &
Means, 1932; Marris, 1964); this impacts the amount of capital funds that are
allocated innovative activities. A firm’s ownership structure influences the amount
of innovation that occurs at firms, but it is unclear which ownership structure model
is the most conducive for an innovative strategy to be successfully deployed (Chen et
al., 2012).
There is contradicting evidence related to how the Board’s composition and the
firm’s ownership structure impact the level of innovative activities that occur at a
firm. Firms must innovate to remain competitive in the market and thrive in the
long-term. Unfortunately, short-term earnings results are important too, which is
often the focus of managers. This research supports Baysinger et al. (1991) who posit
that the knowledge about the impact of institutional investors, which includes both
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active and passive investors and independent Board members, on strategic strategies,
such as innovative ones, is still very limited.
6. Further Research
Research shows that innovative companies have some common traits. Dominant
themes in innovative firms are that they are focused on inventive and pioneering
ideas (Miller, 1993). An innovative firm’s general approach to doing business is to be
faster and execute at a larger scale and more frequently. Further research needs to
be done to determine how high the returns in the long-term are at innovative firms
in comparison to non-innovative ones.
There needs to be further research on the impact of Board composition on a
firm’s strategy. Gender diversity on Boards is a widely researched topic due to some
surprising statistics that women account for only 16.9% of Board members of Fortune
500 companies and 11.9% of Board members in Russell 3000 firms (Pargendler, 2016).
Hoobler, Masterson, Nkomo, & Michel (2016) use meta-analysis to measure the direct
effects that women’s representation in positions such as CEOs, top management
teams, and the Board, have on financial performance. The researchers suggest that
women’s leadership affects a firm’s financial performance. This is a perfect example
of a topic that can be expanded upon.
There needs to be further research on the ease at which firms can successfully
innovate post-IPO versus when they have a private-ownership structure. Spiegel and
Tookes (2008) and Ferreira et al. (2014) show that there is a significant correlation
between public versus private status of a firm and the nature and extent of innovation
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activities. Guo and Zhou (2016) find that firms with greater expansion and progress
of their product pipelines in the first three years of IPOs have greater abnormal
returns during the same period. Guo and Zhou (2016) also suggest that innovation
capability is critical to stock performance and firm survival. These are interesting
topics to further explore.
7. Limitations
1. Patent data fails to capture innovation that occurs outside of the patent system.
Patents are the outputs of innovative activities; R&D expenses are the inputs of
innovative activities (Chemmanur, Loutskina, & Tian, 2014). Firm innovation does
not necessarily need to be patented because companies might rely on trade secrecy of
their invention over obtaining a patent. Kamien and Schwartz (1982) find that there
are shortcomings with patent statistics because many patents never commercialize
or are used for minor modifications of existing products.
Despite this limitation, the goal of this research is to gauge innovative activities
that are unique to the firm so patent data is the most appropriate measure of firm
innovation. There are several studies that use patent data as a measure of firm
innovation (Kogan, Papanikalaou, Seru, & Stoffman, 2012; Seru, 2014). Chemmanur
et al. (2014) justify this approach because patent data captures actual innovation
output and the effectiveness of a firm’s use of its innovation inputs, which is typically
measured by R&D expense.
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2. The use of the HHI as a proxy for ownership concentration is inaccurate because
of the difficulties of fully accounting for every concentrated stockowner at a firm
(Krivka, 2016).
The HHI is important for purposes of this analysis, but every concentrated
shareholder is not captured. This data is sourced from the SEC Schedules 13-F, 13G, and 13-D. A different approach to measuring ownership concentration is seen in
Aghion et al. (2015) where the HHI measure is based on the ownership concentration
of the top five shareholders.
3. The data source for activist investors, institutional investors, and passive
investors has a potential for data error.
Most of the data related to each samples’ SEC filings is sourced from
WhaleWisdom.

WhaleWisdom collects their data within the company, and the

process is entirely automated with little or no human intervention. Without human
oversight, there is a greater risk that the data error exists since we are relying on the
filer to provide accurate information.
4. The patent issue date is used rather than patent application date when collecting
patent data for the sample.
In this research, patent issue date is used.

This is the date when all R&D

activities are legally sanctioned and validated to allow the patent’s assignee to have
the exclusive use of the patented idea or product, and an innovative output is
confirmed. Contrary to this approach, Griliches, Pakes, and Hall (1988) find that the
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choice of application (rather than grant) year better captures the actual time of
innovation.
5. Patent data is used to measure innovation versus R&D expense.
A firm’s R&D expense is the input variable for innovation; these are the upfront
costs that are spent for innovative activities to occur and potentially improve a firm’s
value (Chemmanur et al., 2014). Patents are the output variable of innovation;
patents occur once the innovative activity has created a business concept or product
that a firm or person wants to have sole proprietary rights to use. Because patents
are the measure of innovation rather than R&D expense, there are variances in
results of research studies that use R&D expense as the measure of firm innovation.
For example, Hill and Snell (1998) find a meaningful relationship between R&D
expense and the level of equity ownership by institutional investors. The findings in
this research do not support the notion that there is a relationship between firm
innovation, as measured by patents, and the level of equity ownership by institutional
investors.
6. The sample population consists only of IT firms that are traded on the NASDAQ
stock exchange.
The findings of this research will be different if the sample population is gathered
on firms that are in different industries or traded on different stock exchanges. In
Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2016), the sample is the index constituents for the Russell
1000 and Russell 2000 indices, which serves as an alternative source for company
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data.

This limitation can always be alleviated by changing the sample population

in further research.
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8. Appendix
Appendix A
Descriptive Summary of All Variables in Hypothesis 1-4 and 6
Variable
Variable Type
Type
Independent Activist
Variable
Investors

Method
% ownership

Independent Institutional
Variable
Owners
(Passive)

% ownership

Independent Institutional
Variable
Owners
(Active)

% ownership

Independent Board of
Variable
Directors

Independent
Board
Members /
Total Board
Members
HerfindahlHirschman
Index

Independent Ownership
Variable
Concentration

Control
Variable
Control
Variable
Control
Variable
Control
Variable

R&D expense /
sales
Leverage

Dependent
Variable

Patents

ROA
Market to
Book Value of
Equity

R&D expense /
Annual Sales
Total Debt /
Total Equity
Net Income /
Total Assets
(Company
Share Price *
Outstanding
Shares) /
(Value of
Equity –
Preferred Stock
Equity)
(Number of
Patents) /
Number of
Employees

Source
13-F Filings from
SEC’s website
and Whale
Wisdom
13-G Filings from
SEC’s website
and Whale
Wisdom
13-D Filings from
SEC’s website
and Whale
Wisdom
Annual Proxy
Filings from
SEC’s Website
Filings from
SEC’s website,
WhaleWisdom,
and Mergent
Online
Mergent Online
Mergent Online
Mergent Online
Mergent Online

US Patent
Website
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9. Tables and Figures
Table 1.1
Summary Statistics for the OLS Regression (t-test) Model (Hypothesis 1-4 and 6)
This table presents the summary statistics for the sample of 770, which represents
77 publicly-traded IT firms over a period of 2005-2015. The statistics are calculated
at the firm level.
Patents
Assets
Liabilities
Equity
Net Income
R&D / Sales
# of Employees
N = 770

Mean

108.29
6,800.59
2,935.34
3,836.49
1,057.01
467.25
10,101.15

Mediam

938.26
326.85
637.02
88.36
86.38
2,494.00

Std. Deviation
394.91
23,801.52
11,448.72
12,767.68
4,364.83
1,397.38
22,636.30

Minimum

21.43
0.23
10.64
111.00

Maximum

3,161.00
290,479.00
171,124.00
123,549.00
53,394.00
10,062.00
221,700.00

25

432.51
116.23
241.96
32.45
43.21
987.50

Percentiles (%)
50
938.26
326.85
637.02
88.36
86.38
2,494.00

75

36.00
3,517.42
1,420.10
2,135.66
356.33
237.83
7,455.75

* Assets, Liabilities, Equity, Net Income, and R&D / Sales are in millions

** All variables but Patents and # of Employees are in dollars ($)
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Table 1.2
OLS Regression (t-test) Results for Hypotheses 1-4 and 6
This table presents the Standardized Coefficients, t-values, N, r2, and F-test for the
sample of 770, which represents 77 publicly-traded IT firms over a period of 2005 –
2015. The statistics were calculated at the firm level. All variables (Years 2006 –
2015, Institutional Investor, Passive Investor, Activist Investor, Independent Board
Member, Ownership Concentration, Leverage, ROA, and Market to Book Value of
Equity) are treated as Independent Variables, and Innovation is the Dependent
Variable. These are the regression results for all hypotheses but the fifth hypothesis.
Dependent Variable: Innovation
Control Variables:

2006
2007

2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Leverage
Return on Assets
Market to Book Value of Equity

Independent Variables

Ownership Concentration
Activist Investor
Passive Investor
Institutional Investor
Independent Board Member

1

2

3a

3b

4

6

0.38
1.66
(2.95)
1.57
1.67
(2.08)
36.91
34.46
(60.80)
32.59
34.68
(43.89)
0.38
1.13
(0.70)
1.09
1.20
(0.04)
25.74
23.19
(14.41)
22.45
24.74
(0.94)
0.38
1.41
(1.13)
1.04
1.56
(0.05)
21.57
28.79
(23.32)
21.12
31.76
(1.10)
0.38
2.34
(0.90)
2.61
2.30
0.64
43.33
48.27
(18.63)
53.91
47.26
13.46
0.38
0.77
(1.48)
0.84
0.81
(1.19)
2.95
15.93
(30.56)
17.48
16.67
(25.10)
0.38
4.39
2.38
4.06
4.52
2.42
70.28
90.50
49.01
83.81
93.21
50.95
0.38
4.87
2.69
5.19
4.85
2.62
87.75
100.22
55.64
107.28
99.72
55.03
0.38
4.91
2.73
5.06
4.92
3.02
89.12
101.27
56.46
105.05
101.71
63.58
0.38
8.14*
5.93
8.57*
8.04*
6.28
160.81
167.87
122.82
177.92
165.69
132.37
0.38
7.54
5.48
7.84
7.49
6.39
154.36
154.67
113.50
162.32
153.55
134.53
0.06
(6.45)
(5.89)
-6.34
(6.40)
(6.33)
(133.96) (145.47) (131.68) (143.40) (144.33) (145.07)
1.33
11.22*** 11.40*** 12.75*** 10.64*** 11.15***
305.23
294.89
299.29
331.83
277.49
297.66
0.03
(8.23)*
(8.80)
(7.58)*
(8.43)*
(6.65)
(139.43) (183.03) (194.36) (168.25) (187.61) (149.71)
0.91
(98.49)
0.87
(68.64)
0.51**
218.08
0.98
111.28
0.29***
(512.73)
770

N
2
r
0.08
F-test 3.48***

5.50
151.89

770

0.04
2.15***

(2.55)
(70.06)

770

0.04
2.01**

8.26**
224.52

770

0.04
2.35***

5.70
156.24
770

0.04
2.16***

(18.02)***
(509.26)
770
0.07
3.90***

This table represents OLS regression data, which is comprised of the Standardized Coefficent (t-value). All
coefficients and t-values have been multiplied by 100. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Table 1.3
Summary Statistics for the Hierarchical Regression Model (Hypothesis 5) – Pre /
Post IPO
This table presents the summary statistics for 29 publicly-traded IT firms over a
period of 2008 – 2016. The summary statistics are calculated at the firm level. There
are no Control Variables. The Independent Variable is Pre-IPO patent data, and the
Dependent Variable is Post-IPO patent data.

Innovation

Mean
Post-IPO
Pre-IPO

1.19
0.45

Std. Dev
0.60
0.56

N
29.00
29.00
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Table 1.4
Regression Results for the Hierarchical Regression Model (Hypothesis 5) – Pre /
Post – IPO Data
This table presents the regression statistics for 29 publicly-traded IT firms over a
period of 2008 – 2016. The regression statistics are calculated at the firm level. There
are no Control Variables. The Independent Variable is Pre-IPO patent data, and the
Dependent Variable is Post-IPO patent data.

Innovation - Post - IPO
B
(Constant)
Pre-IPO
F

0.94
0.55
4.11

2

0.26

R
N = 29
p > .05

Beta

0.51

t

p
4.95
2.03

0.00
0.07

57

